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INTRODUCTION
This article reports on a topic assigned to a recent
legal conference panel that discussed safety fitness
determinations for motor carriers.  The assigned topic,
focused on safety fitness determinations, big data, and
due process; begs the question of whether the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA or the
Agency) is measuring anything that’s really relevant to
the “safety” or “fitness” of a motor carrier of passengers
or property to operate on the Nation’s highways.  Even
if FMCSA thinks it is measuring safety or fitness, the
more important question is whether those
measurements are accurate or fair.  I submit that the
successive efforts of FMCSA and its predecessor
agencies to measure safety and fitness based on mass
quantities of roadside inspection data are incapable
of either accuracy or fairness.  This is true of the
methodology known as Compliance, Safety,
Responsibility (CSA) and was true of its SAFESTAT
predecessor before 2010.  The same will be true if
FMCSA ever tries to implement the recommendations
of the National Academies of Sciences (NAS) for
vastly expanded data collection as envisioned in the
Item Response Theory (IRT).
Those three methodologies share the following flaws:
 the “big data” gathered is “bad data” for comparison
purposes, because of the patchwork of performance
standards used by law enforcement in 50 States;
 this “big data” is paradoxically not “big enough” due
to the small sample sizes typically gathered for small
carriers; and
  FMCSA has no track record of consistency or
competence in managing and analyzing “big data” as
part of its current programs, let alone in handling the
mathematical complexities that would be inherent in
IRT analysis.
The Agency’s history of data mismanagement has been
well-documented in the context of the Safety
Measurement System (SMS) developed under CSA.
But if we look beyond past history with SMS, the
same problems threaten to cripple the Agency’s future
response to other regulatory issues in the supply chain.
FMCSA is still struggling with the basic task of writing
computer code to support the Unified Registration
System (URS) it unveiled as a “final rule” in 2013.  It
has yet to comply with literally dozens of mandates
under the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act,
Pub.L. 114-94 (FAST Act) for procedural reform in
areas that include but are not limited to SMS.  Thus it
is ill-equipped to analyze emerging regulatory issues
ranging from crash preventability to the safety of “last
mile” delivery operators.  Instead, the Agency too often
flounders from one issue to the next, substituting
evanescent “guidance” for predictable rules.  These
issues of poor data quality, small sample sizes, data
mismanagement, institutional “innumeracy” (look it up)
and regulatory improvisation pose existential threats
to administrative due process, as will be developed in
more detail below.
ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUE
By now an ample body of evidence has been
presented to FMCSA, to the United States
Department of Transportation (USDOT) and to
Congress regarding the defects of SAFESTAT and
SMS methodology.2  This evidence comes from federal
watchdog agencies, from academic studies and even
from NAS in its review of SMS under the FAST Act.
The major shortcomings of roadside inspections as a
surrogate for safety fitness are detailed in Attachment 1.
Those shortcomings include:
 State by state disparities in safety enforcement
policies mean that SMS scores largely depend on
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19
Journal of Transportation Management
where a carrier operates, not on the inherent safety of
those operations.
 The Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) has
stated that the roadside inspections undergone by small
motor carriers typically fail to yield sufficient sample
sizes to reflect the overall safety of such fleets over
time.
 The “law of large numbers” ensures that an occasional
bad inspection will cause much more severe
fluctuations in the SMS score for a small fleet than for
a larger one.
 The impact of a bad inspection is magnified by
widespread under-reporting of “clean” inspections.
 The Agency’s 800-plus “enhancements” of SMS
methodology since its launch in 2010 detract from the
predictability and usefulness of its performance
standards, and have ignored established procedures
for due process in rulemaking.
 Most importantly, the percentile scores generated
by SMS from roadside inspection data fail to predict
the actual crash history of individual motor carriers.
Numerous crash-free carriers within the artificial peer
groupings created under SMS suffer from guilt by
association due to “averaging of averages” with regard
to aggregate performance levels.
Bigger Data =  Better Data
Although the NAS report recognizes many of the SMS
statistical problems described above, its proposed
solution is essentially “more of the same.”  The
proposed IRT model would vastly expand the amount,
type and complexity of data gathered from motor
carriers, to include competitively sensitive data such
as method and amount of compensation, type of cargo
transported, and driver turnover.  The additional costs
of gathering and analyzing such additional data are
likely to be compounded by industry resistance to
providing it in the first place.
In addition, fundamental legal issues are raised by two
recommendations in the NAS Report (at p.5), to the
effect that an IRT model should “allow for the addition
of new safety measures as they become available,
without having to start from scratch” and should “adapt
to changes in safety over time.”  These
recommendations would exacerbate the worst feature
of SMS from a due-process standpoint – the
constantly moving targets resulting from its endless
“enhancements” of the scoring system.  With or without
the IRT overlay, SMS cannot become the basis for
definitive safety fitness determinations as long as its
criteria are subject to constant revision without prior
notice and opportunity for comment.  While it may be
understandable that the statisticians authoring the NAS
report were not aware of the due process requirements
for making and changing rules under the Administrative
Procedure Act, FMCSA has no such excuse.
Can FMCSA Handle Big Data?
When FMCSA requested public comments on the
NAS report last year, it targeted a December 2017
release date for a “Corrective Action Plan” in response
to NAS.  At this writing in April 2018, we’re still
waiting – but this observer is not surprised.  With due
respect and regret, it must be said that FMCSA is
barely able to maintain the data bases and IT systems
supporting its current activities, let alone address the
complexities or IRT.
The five-year debacle that is URS already has been
mentioned.  Last summer, two federal watchdogs
renewed their criticisms of data management by
FMCSA.  The USDOT Inspector General stated in
Report No. ST2017065 (July 25, 2017) that the
Agency needed “to address its quality assurance
processes and compliance review data limitations.”
Similarly, a GAO report (No. GAO-17-488, July 13,
2017) called on FMCSA to modernize legacy IT
systems, including development of “well-defined goals,
strategies, measures and timelines.”  More recently,
the Agency’s online registry of certified medical
examiners for drivers was hacked on December 1,
2017 and remained out of service more than three
months later (Transport Topics, March 19, 2018, pp.
1, 47).  Perhaps it is time for FMCSA to borrow IT
staff from sister agencies such as the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics in order to upgrade its data
management.
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The above background casts serious doubt on the
feasibility of implementing the abstruse IRT model.  In
all likelihood, that model would turn out to be an even
costlier and more data-intensive version of SMS.
Considering that SMS is still riddled with statistical,
logical and legal defects after eight years of
“enhancements,” adding an IRT overlay would amount
to throwing good money after bad.  Isn’t it time for
FMCSA to consider alternative ways of fulfilling the
statutory mandate (see 49 U.S.C. § 31144(a)) that
actual safety fitness determinations be assigned to all
532,000 truck and bus fleets it regulates?  One such
alternative would be to expand desktop audits, now
used by FMCSA for “new entrant” carriers, into a
fee-based program linked to the periodic MCS-150
updates now required for all fleets.  Details of this
proposal, including follow-up site visits as warranted,
have been spelled out for FMCSA in comments
repeatedly filed for coalitions represented by myself
and my co-panelist Hank Seaton, whose contributions
to the analysis underlying this paper have been
significant and are valued by the author.
CONCLUSION:
BEYOND SMS, NAS, IRT AND THE FAST
ACT
FMCSA’s unfinished business under the FAST Act is
not limited to dealing with the NAS report.  Wholly
aside from the FAST Act mandates still facing FMCSA
with regard to safety fitness issues and administrative
procedures generally, the industry is facing many other
regulatory challenges necessitating improved IT and
data management at FMCSA.  These issues include:
 Misuse of flawed SMS data by the plaintiffs’ bar in
accident cases.
 Crash “preventability” determinations in FMCSA
mini-trials.
 How to regulate the safety of “last mile” deliveries,
especially in vehicles too small for coverage under
FMCSA safety regulations.
 How the hours-of-service regulations in 49 C.F.R.
Part 395 might be adapted to take account of emerging
research on fatigue management.
 Whether and how to modify Part 395 in view of the
increasing economic toll of vehicle detention and the
onset of electronic logging.
 Whether the emerging issue of salvage for food
shipments should be jointly addressed by FMCSA
and the Food & Drug Administration (FDA).in view
of shipper claims that the “actual loss” standards of
the Carmack Amendment (49 U.S.C. § 14706) are
changed by “adulteration” provisions in new FDA
regulations on sanitary food transportation (21 C.F.R.
Part 1).
 And finally, how to reform FMCSA procedures to
allow independent administrative review of safety
fitness determinations to at least the extent now
available for civil penalties with less severe commercial
impacts.
Attachment 1:
Excerpt from Comments of MCRR Coalition in
Docket FMCSA-2017-0226
1 Editor’s Note
– This article is written in a law review style and
advocates a particular positon as is common in law
review articles.  The article has been formatted for
the journal’s style but the references are not in
JTM’s typical style.  The Journal does not take a
position on the points made by the author.
9990390.1/SP/00005/0034/051818
(Footnotes)
1 See, e.g., comments filed with FMCSA on
September 27, 2017 by a coalition (for which your
author and co-panelist Hank Seaton served as
counsel) in response to the NAS study of SMS.  A
full copy of that filing can be viewed at https://
www.regulations.gov/document?D=FMCSA-2017-
0226-0014 .  An excerpt from it is reproduced in
Attachment 1  to this paper.
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IV. Responses to Federal Register notice
In the following discussion, Commenters will address the NAS recommendations set out in the Agency’s
August 28 Federal Register notice. In doing so, Commenters will point out that no corrective action plan
can be confined to these recommendations in light of the analysis of the FAST Act and the limitations of the
systemically flawed SMS.
ATTACHMENT
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A. Recommendation 1 – Item Response
Theory Model
Systemic flaws that undermine SMS
methodology would plague any statistical
model based on the same data – even the NAS
panel’s proposed IRT approach
After spending 10 years in its development,
FMCSA has made more than 800 changes to its
safety weighting procedures and its convoluted
algorithms in an effort to “improve” the accuracy of
its system. Yet the Agency has failed to address
systemic flaws that Commenters have consistently
presented but that have been ignored.
The NAS Report expresses a belief that introducing
more types of data and using a more rigorous
mathematical formula to interpret and normalize the
data will result in more accurate and reliable scoring
among the carriers than is currently available under
SMS. In particular, Chapter 2 of the NAS Report
acknowledges many current deficiencies of SMS
and concedes that most of them are not readily
fixed. The report fails to recognize, however, that
similar flaws would pervade its proposed IRT
model, which would try to predict crash risk by
crunching even more gargantuan amounts of data
using algorithms even more complex than those of
SMS.
Although the MCRR Coalition will not explore the
systemic flaws of SMS in detail at this point, we
believe a brief recap is necessary to show issues not
fully addressed in the NAS Report’s support of the
IRT Model. As we have established in previous
submissions to FMCSA1, SMS suffers from at least
seven systemic flaws:
· Insufficient data
· The law of small numbers
· Misuse of average crash rates
· Misuse of crash data
· State-by-State enforcement inconsistencies
· Peer group creep
· Profiling
· Enforcement biases
Insufficient Data
Although FMCSA has now withdrawn its misguided
SFD Proposal, it bears noting that the Agency in
that docket could identify a mere 262 carriers as
unfit using data alone. The principal reason is that
there simply isn’t enough data to establish reliable
metrics on the vast majority of motor carriers.
Evidence of insufficient data is extensive, but just a
few points will suffice here: Based on our analysis of
the 24-month SMS snapshot for August 2017,
among the 532,000 active U.S. interstate motor
carriers:
· 39.6% had no inspections
· Just 7.5% had 20 or more total inspections
– the minimum threshold of data sufficiency
recommended by GAO for individual
BASICs
· 83.7% do not have the minimum number of
inspections with violations to be considered
in any of the five public SMS BASICs even
under FMCSA’s inadequate data sufficiency
thresholds2
The Driver Fitness and Controlled Substances/
Alcohol BASICs each capture fewer than 1 percent
of active U.S. motor carriers. Meanwhile, the
Unsafe Driving and Hours-of-Service Compliance
BASICs have seen and will continue to see major
declines in data sufficiency. The Unsafe Driving
BASIC suffers from the huge decline over the past
decade in traffic enforcement (“TE”) inspections,
which are the sole source of data for this BASIC.
As seen in Figure APP-1 these inspections peaked
in 2006 and have since dropped 59.6%. TE
inspections are down 37.4% since the year
FMCSA implemented CSA. The drop in TE
inspections has leveled off, but there are no signs of
a rebound.
Likewise, the growth in popularity of electronic
logging among larger carriers apparently has starved
the HOS Compliance BASIC of many data points
previously collected at roadside, and this trend
should become even more pronounced once the
electronic logging device mandate is fully
implemented. The ELD mandate could help correct
a different systemic flaw in SMS – enforcement bias
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– and of course should improve compliance with the
HOS regulations. But it could also render the HOS
Compliance BASIC obsolete.
Given these trends, even under FMCSA’s clearly
inadequate current standards of data sufficiency, the
Vehicle Maintenance BASIC – in which just 12% of
carriers meet the minimum
threshold – could become the only BASIC with
anything remotely approaching a meaningful amount
of data, albeit with a preponderance of low-value
violations. (See “Enforcement biases” below.)
However, applying the data sufficiency standard
recommended by GAO, SMS basically disappears
except, arguably, as a tool for monitoring large
carriers. This is a systemic flaw that FMCSA is
powerless to rectify and that would plague any
statistical model.
Law of Small Numbers
The law of small numbers is in large part a function
of data insufficiency. As has been widely recognized,
SMS metrics become extremely volatile as the
number of data points drops. This is the same
phenomenon – small sample size – that leads
baseball fans to pay little attention to early-season
batting averages. As noted above, GAO concluded
that SMS metrics could be reliable only at a higher
data sufficiency standard of at least 20 observations.
Although the NAS Report does not refer explicitly
to the law of small numbers, it is quite clear
regarding the impact of the phenomenon. We quote
the following again for emphasis:
There is no getting around the point that
providing BASIC measures to carriers that
have very infrequent inspections will result in
highly variable assessments of such carriers.
This is simply because not much is known
about the frequency of violations for small
carriers. Such high variance measures can
result in mischaracterizing the nature of a
carrier—the high variability could result in
the carrier being given alerts more or less
often than what would be warranted given
its behavior. On the other hand, the industry
is highly skewed, being comprised of a very
large number of small carriers. If the data
sufficiency standards were raised, a high
percentage of the industry would be
excluded from measurement by SMS and
therefore monitoring by FMCSA. We
believe that this issue should be further
investigated. (NAS Report, p. 46)
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But while the NAS Report recognizes the law of
small numbers and acknowledges GAO’s argument
on data sufficiency, it basically passes the buck to
FMCSA to make a policy decision and argues that
the IRT model “will have some ability to reduce the
variance of these measures through the use of
smoothing with the measures of a carrier’s peers.”
NAS Report, p. 46
Commenters submit that “some ability” to reduce
variances is hardly a fix for this systemic flaw, which
cannot be merely shrugged off given its impact on
small carriers and the NAS panel’s inability to
identify the new data to be surveyed, let alone its
quantity or its predictive accuracy.
Misuse of Average Crash Rates
A similar problem relates to how FMCSA misuses
the data in formulating regulatory and enforcement
policy. Our Coalition has consistently challenged the
Agency’s use of average carrier performance to
make sweeping claims that do not describe the
reality of individual carriers. We submitted the
following graphs (Figure APP-2) as part of our
comments filed in July 2012 in Docket No.
FMCSA-2012-0074 and again in May 2016 in
response to the SFD Proposal (Docket No.
FMCSA-2015-0001). These graphs show
FMCSA’s regression of average crash rates for
carriers in the Fatigued Driving (now HOS
Compliance) and Unsafe Driving BASICs
compared to a plot of the individual carriers’ crash
rates.
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The upshot is that SMS is not remotely predictive of
individual carriers’ safety performance where it
matters most – i.e., crashes. As discussed earlier,
this flaw lies at the very heart of what Congress
wanted to address in the NAS correlation study.
Both the Agency and the NAS panel have been
presented with this study and have not addressed
the issue. In fact, in their response to the Agency’s
NPRM in 2016, Commenters demonstrated this
regression of averages when applied to peer group
percentiles misidentified 53% of profiled carriers
who had no crashes during the review period as
“bad actors” warranting unfit ratings.
Crash Data
The SMS structure traditionally has depended upon
counting all reported accidents without any
scrubbing for “preventability,” let alone for causation
or – even more appropriate – for absence of carrier
compliance with safety regulations resulting in
causation. DataQ simply does not work since the
Agency insists on publishing data under a
“presumed guilty until proven innocent” basis. And it
does not determine causation, nor can it at less than
prohibitive cost. The light scrubbing the Agency now
offers for preventability determinations – in very
limited scenarios as part of its two-year pilot
program – cannot possibly offer a remedy for small
carriers unlucky enough to be caught up in accidents
that were not their fault.
Multiple studies have shown that most fatal car-
truck crashes are not the result of actions by the
commercial motor vehicle driver.3 FMCSA’s annual
Large Truck and Bus Crash Facts publication
consistently shows essentially the same breakdowns
with around 84% to 86% of passenger vehicle
drivers being cited for driver factors and only 26%
to 35% of truck drivers cited with driver factors.4
Regarding crash preventability, the NAS Report is
equivocal. It lists (at pp. 48-50) several factors that
would complicate a proposal to set aside non-
preventable crashes. On the other hand, the report
acknowledges that including non-preventable
crashes is potentially misleading because any carrier
placed in the same situation would have crashed,
meaning that the crash is simply a consequence of
circumstances, not carrier or driver misdeed. “This
is an important issue, especially for small carriers,
since such events can be extremely damaging,
possibly putting some small carriers out of
business.” NAS Report, p. 48. As is evidenced
elsewhere in the report, the NAS panel seems
willing to shrug off the problem, and live with a
system that it acknowledges is grossly unfair to small
carriers.
Inconsistent Enforcement
A system that compares carriers operating under
different state regimes cannot be justified,
particularly when the evidence shows significant
variation in enforcement prerogatives by state. For
example, commenters have long demonstrated that
enforcement anomalies distort any effort to
normalize or compare speeding violations among
carriers that operate in different areas. Consider
Figure APP-3 below, which shows that Indiana –
accounting for about 3% of commercial vehicle
miles each year – writes up 10% of all reported
commercial vehicle moving violations nationwide.5
Neighboring state Michigan accounts for slightly
more than 5% of the moving violations but less than
2% of the miles. Among the top 10 states in moving
violations, five – Indiana, Michigan, Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and Ohio – are in the Great Lakes
region. Carriers that operate in western states
inevitably have better Unsafe Driving scores than
carriers that operate in the Midwest.
Disparate enforcement also is evidenced by
differences in the number of inspections. Together,
Texas and California represent more than 40% of
inspections conducted by state personnel, excluding
federal inspections at the border. While those two
states are by far the nation’s largest in terms of
commercial vehicle miles traveled, their share of
inspections far exceeds their share of vehicle miles,
which combined is about 20%.
While it is true that the high level of freight activity in
these two states naturally calls for more inspections
than in, say, the Plains or Mountain West, SMS
methodology does not consider regional differences.
For example, in 2016, Maryland ranked fifth in the
number of state inspections at 3.28% of the total,
but only 30th in the number of commercial vehicle
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miles traveled. New Mexico is seventh in
inspections but only 19th in the number of
commercial vehicle miles. On the other hand, Ohio
ranks fourth in commercial vehicle miles but only
13th in inspections. And Louisiana is 13th in
commercial vehicle miles but 27th in inspections.
The NAS report suggests that an IRT-based model
could help adjust for enforcement disparities.
Maybe a model could be created to simulate a
more even distribution of enforcement activities, but
the result would be just that: a model. The
potentially devastating impact on carriers of relative
metrics – especially if made public – is too great to
be based on complex calculated projections rather
than actual on-road results. Once again, the NAS
Report effectively shrugs off an existential threat to
small carriers who find themselves in the wrong
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place at the wrong time – especially when crash
causation and the law of small numbers are factored
in.
Peer Group Creep
Commenters have long pointed out the distortions of
SMS metrics that can result from carriers’ shifts
among safety event groups, especially as small
carriers with volatile metrics ease into a slightly
larger peer group. We are heartened, therefore, by
the NAS report’s recognition of this phenomenon
and even somewhat encouraged by FMCSA’s initial
response on the topic. See 82 Fed. Reg. at 40831.
However, Commenters contend that peer group
creep is a bigger problem than FMCSA concedes.
We believe FMCSA’s suggestion “that the
methodology should be revised so that a safety
event that is not a violation or a crash is not the sole
reason for an increased measure or percentile” is
too narrow. Even if an inspection that includes a
violation kicks a carrier into a more stringent safety
event group, that carrier could instantly appear
significantly less safe than is justified by a single
violation.
Profiling
As Commenters have shown in past proceedings,
anomalous reporting results from the assignment of
inspection values to carriers; the availability of weigh
station bypass systems like PrePass; and a failure to
report clean inspections uniformly throughout all
states.
As members of the MCRR Coalition noted in
response to FMCSA’s SFD Proposal, the Agency’s
use of inspection profiling and the Inspection
Selection System (“ISS”) program are inherently
biased against small carriers. An unwarranted
“negative feedback loop” is created when the
system relies primarily on past inspections to target
current inspections. Inspection profiling undoubtedly
explains why small carriers receive far more scrutiny
than their larger brethren. Power units operated by
motor carriers with 1 to 4 trucks are inspected
nearly three times as often as those operated by
carriers with 1,000 or more trucks.6
At the outset, Commenters take issue with the
statement of Joseph DeLorenzo, director of the
FMCSA Office of Enforcement and Compliance, at
the September 8 public meeting in this docket
regarding clean inspections. While DeLorenzo’s
comment that 40% of reported inspections do not
involve a violation is factually correct, it is misleading
because once again there is a wide disparity among
states. California, which reports more inspections
than any other state, had a clean inspection rate in
2016 of 56.2%, behind only Mississippi, Montana,
West Virginia, and Alaska. On the other hand,
Texas, which reports the second-largest number of
inspections, had a clean inspection rate near the
bottom at 26.1%. Ten states had clean inspection
rates below 25%.
Moreover, the above figures are based on situations
when an inspection is actually reported. Another
major concern is situations when inspectors choose
not to report inspections at all because no violation
was unearthed in a walk-around. Analyzing this
problem obviously is thorny because it involves
quantifying the extent of non-existent data.
However, there is data beyond extensive anecdotal
reports of missing clean inspections. For example, in
a survey conducted in 2016 by Overdrive and
research firm TransAdvise, 48% of carriers
reported that clean inspections are not consistently
recorded in their experience.7
Enforcement Biases
Analysts and regulators tend to ignore the fact that
the data feeding their models and databases
originate with state agencies and individual
inspectors. Commenters have already referred to
this phenomenon in the discussion of inconsistent
enforcement. For example, Midwestern states such
as Indiana and Michigan have focused much of their
enforcement efforts in the Unsafe Driving BASIC,
while Texas and California have placed relatively
more emphasis on the Vehicle Maintenance and
Driver Fitness BASICs. Once again, the NAS
Report (at p. 51) seems to shrug off state-by-state
enforcement differences as being “not something
that FMCSA can unilaterally change.”
Journal of Transportation Management
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Another bias lies in the types of violations that
inspectors report within individual BASICs. It is
much easier to catch a driver on a reporting
oversight than it is to painstakingly compare
supporting documents to log grids in order to prove
a false log. And it is easier to cite a vehicle for an
inoperative lamp than it is to crawl under the chassis
to inspect brakes caked with dirt and grease.
The effectiveness of the two most important
BASICs in terms of carriers covered – Vehicle
Maintenance and HOS Compliance – is undermined
by a dominance of minor violations. For example,
about half of the HOS Compliance violations are
form and manner infractions. The Vehicle
Maintenance BASIC is heavily skewed toward
violations, such as inoperative marker lights, that
standing alone are insufficient to signify that
equipment is unfit to operate. Also, profiling of units
for vehicle maintenance inspections is particularly
high and prejudicial to intermodal carriers, to
owner-operators that operate older equipment, and
to oilfield carriers that frequently operate off-road.
If the proposed IRT model does not completely
resolve the state-by-state inspection and violation
distribution discrepancies, or if individual states are
not forced into uniformity in inspection and data-
collection methods, the same systemic flaws will
continue to plague the new model. But even if those
systemic flaws somehow could be resolved, no
statistical model can veto or repeal the law of small
numbers. The NAS Report essentially advocates an
enormous investment of time and money to create a
highly opaque set of algorithms that – because of
these systemic flaws – at best would be only
marginally more effective than SMS.
(Footnotes)
1 Members of this coalition have explored SMS
flaws exhaustively in multiple proceedings, most
recently in the docket concerning the now-
withdrawn SFD Proposal. See
https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=FMCSA-2015-0001-0184
. See also
https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=FMCSA-2012-0074-0070
.
2 Although percentiles and alerts currently are
withheld for property carriers, FMCSA now
publishes absolute measures on these carriers,
which are not subject to any data sufficiency
thresholds. These measures are subject to
misinterpretation and are potentially even more
damaging than the relative metrics published
previously.
3 For example, see
The Relative Contribution of Truck Drivers and
Passenger Car Drivers to Two-Vehicle, Truck-
Car Traffic Crashes
, D.F. Blower, Publication No. UMTRI-98-25,
UMTRI, 1998.
4 For example, see the Large Truck and Bus Crash
Facts 2015 at
https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/fmcsa.dot.gov/files/
docs/safety/data-and-statistics/Large-Truck-and-
Bus-Crash-Facts-2015.pdf , p. 77.
5 A substantial number of moving violations likely go
unreported to FMCSA’s Motor Carrier
Management Information System because of a
change in SAFETEA-LU that allowed states to
receive grant funds for issuing moving violation
citations on motor carriers without reporting an
associated inspection. Many consider this to be the
principal reason for the huge drop in traffic
enforcement inspections since the mid-2000s.
6 See the Vise affidavit in the Coalition comments on
the SFD Proposal:
https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=FMCSA-2015-0001-0184
7 See
id.
